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Representations and the Corruption of Goods 
 
Martin K. Jones1 
 
Abstract: Critiques of Economics by the philosophers Michael Sandel and Ruth Grant reveal 
a substantive issue within economic theorising, that of attitude change, leading to the so-
called “corruption of goods”. It is argued that current models within economics cannot 
sensibly handle attitude change in the dimensions discussed by Sandel and Grant. Instead it 
can be modelled using multirepresentational games- games that allow interpretations of 
situations by players to change within the game. Although this may result in inconsistency 
within games, it is demonstrated how this can be resolved and how useful they are in 






  Michael Sandel’s book “What Money Can’t Buy” (Sandel 2012) has had a considerable 
impact in the non-economics world as a critique of economics. It has emerged at a time when 
the discipline has already been under scrutiny for its failure in macroeconomics to predict the 
Financial Crisis of 2007. In the economics world, Sandel’s impact in published articles has 
been limited. The only article in a major journal that confronts his arguments head-on is that 
of Besley (2013). Besley’s article provides a good overview of Sandel’s ideas and highlights 
recent work in economics that acts as at least a partial response to many of Sandel’s 
criticisms. Besley admits the force of many of Sandel’s arguments and recommends that 
economists carry out further research to tackle some of the issues that he raises. This paper 
aims to carry out this recommendation by analysing one of those issues. 
   The issue that Sandel raises, which I would like to focus upon in this paper, is that of the 
corruption of goods. This occurs when goods that have previously transacted in one 
institutional setting are transferred to another institutional setting. As a result of this, the 
norms underlying these goods are undermined leading to significant changes in behaviour 
and a loss in value (in the broadest sense) to the individuals involved. A similar notion is put 
forward by the philosopher Ruth Grant (2012), who has written a book critical of the idea of 
incentives as used within economics. According to Grant, the use of material incentives in a 
situation where incentives were not used previously can corrupt the good and lead to 
undesirable consequences. This is not a novel idea, as this concern has previously been 
brought up within economics by Hirsch (1977). 
  The position taken in this paper is that corruption of goods is part of a much wider unsolved 
problem within economics, that of changes of attitude. There have been remarkably few 
attempts to solve this problem, even within the narrower formulation of changes in tastes. 
Those attempts that have been made have generally found to be question-begging or faulty in 
other ways. I will argue that it is possible to model changes in attitude, and so the corruption 
of goods, through the use of multirepresentational games- games that allow for changes in 
players’ interpretations of the world within the game. 
  The main argument in this paper is that current models used to explain attitude change are 
inadequate and that multirepresentational games provide a far better modelling technique. 
Multirepresentational games are presented as being similar to ordinary games except for 
issues relating to utilities in the games. It is assumed that, as a result of adopting different 
representations in a game, this may change one’s assessment of an outcome’s utility. The 
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main problem is that if one’s interpretation of a situation changes partway through a game 
then this presents problems to a reasonable individual if they are trying to assess the overall 
strategy they should pursue in the game as a whole. This is because the game as whole is 
inconsistent when a person’s utility of a given outcome changes according to their position in 
the game tree. This paper will look at a way in which ideas about interpretation can be 
introduced into games and such inconsistencies resolved without doing too much violence to 
the framework of conventional game theory. 
Since we will be discussing attitudes and are trying to keep the widest application 
possible, there will be no attempt to preserve the assumption of universal self-interest within 
this paper. No distinction will be made between whether preferences are self-interested or 
social. It is assumed that agents will tend to behave in a self-interested or social way 
depending on the reasons that they have for acting in one way or another (in a manner to be 
explained). Given the wide range of experimental and theoretical papers that have been 
published asserting, and experimentally justifying, the existence of social preferences (see for 
example Fehr & Gachter 2000), I will not give a justification for this assumption. 
 Furthermore, I will assume that some of the reasons underlying choice will be based on 
values. Values will be handled informally in this paper but can be seen simply as the 
importance that an individual places on something.  In the absence of universal self- interest, 
values become the main markers as to what an individual finds important or unimportant 
since one’s own self-interest cannot act universally in that role. However, it will also be 
assumed that sometimes an individual’s self- interest is seen as valuable and so important. In 
such a case one could say that the individual’s self- interest is itself a value. For the purposes 
of this paper, it will mostly be assumed that values can be subsumed into preferences as 
“most preferred” items. However, these preferences can be self-interested or non-self-
interested depending on the reasons2 given. 
  The rejection of universal self-interest and the use of values should be central to any 
purported explanation of attitude change. Any purported theory that focussed on self-
interested attitudes would be a highly anaemic theory that would explain very little (see 
Mansbridge 1998). Such a theory would fail to answer Sandel and Grant’s criticisms and 
would be an exercise in explaining away rather than explanation. However, modern decision 





theory. All that is required is that, given the game strategies and outcomes, one’s preferences 
are consistent. 
 
2) Corruption of goods 
To put the topic in context, we will give examples from Sandel and Grant which will 
provide a basis for discussion and also examples to be modelled at the end of the paper. Many 
of these examples are not unique to Sandel or Grant and indeed they draw heavily on ideas 
from economic journals, as will be indicated in the text. However, the reason for focussing on 
Sandel and Grant is that their notion of goods being “corrupted” is a useful generalisation that 
will inform the paper’s focus on a new model in a way that current economic papers do not 
do. 
 Sandel’s first example is the notion of a gift- why are gifts in Western countries 
usually given in kind rather than in monetary form? As Sandel points out, money is a better 
gift because it is fungible- it can be used by the recipient to buy whatever they want. 
However, a money gift is usually disliked in Western culture because it is seen as 
demonstrating a lack of care and attention by the giver. By converting gift-giving into a 
simple monetary transaction, one is undermining the whole value of the gift. A more extreme 
example is that of friendship- one cannot buy friendship because a bought friend is simply 
not a friend at all. 
Another example is that of paying students to learn by giving them a monetary 
incentive to achieve high grades. The main argument in favour of this is, of course, to 
improve educational outcomes. However, there are a variety of arguments against this policy. 
One of the main arguments is the so-called crowding out argument: the monetary extrinsic 
motive crowds out any intrinsic motive. Essentially, education is no longer being desired for 
its intrinsic merits but for monetary outcomes. There is a large literature on this (See Bowles 
& Polania Reyes 2012 for a review) but, in essence, the outcome is that the nature of the good 
changes when making it into a marketable good. Instead of being something done for its own 
sake, education becomes a good that is traded for money. 
A more extreme example is that of bribery. Bribery is the use of incentives in order to 
achieve an outcome favourable to the briber. An example would be to bribe a judge to let a 
person have a reduced sentence. As Grant points out, this actually satisfies most of the 
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conventional moral strictures of modern economics- bribes are non-coercive and increase 
welfare for both briber and recipient (assuming that they are not caught). In strict economic 
terms, there is an increase in welfare. The objection comes from elsewhere: bribery 
undermines the norm of justice that a judge is supposed to enforce. A judge therefore would 
be expected to reject the bribe as accepting it would be an immoral form of behaviour for 
him. 
An example from Sandel comes from a study by Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1996) 
relating to a referendum in 1993 on whether or not to have a nuclear waste repository near to 
the village of Wolfenschiessen in Switzerland. In a study prior to the referendum, the 
villagers were given a survey on whether they would vote to accept the nuclear waste 
repository or not. The bulk of residents indicated that they would accept it. In a subsequent 
survey, the villagers were asked the same question and offered an incentive of an annual 
monetary payment to accept the depository.  
From a pure economics point of view, one would have expected the incentives to 
reinforce the altruistic attitude shown by the villagers but, surprisingly, the villagers, by a 
substantial margin, rejected the offer. In this case it is argued, civic duty is corrupted by the 
offer of an incentive by converting it into a market transaction. The value of accepting the 
good because one was fulfilling one’s public duty was undermined by offering the incentive. 
The final example relates to the provision of an exit option. Quite often, economists 
believe that if people disapprove of a particular arrangement for providing a good then they 
can express their disapproval by exiting from that market. As a result of this, if they stay in 
the market then they implicitly approve of any changes made. It follows that if people do tend 
to stay in the market then the good in question has not been corrupted as long as they have an 
exit option available and they have not used it. However, as Peter (2004) points out, this is to 
confuse choice with consent. One can have a low opinion of a particular way of distributing a 
good without wanting to exit from the distribution of the good. 
An example of the above may be seen in the provision of health services in the UK’s 
National Health Service. Over the past twenty years there has been an increased tendency for 
NHS services to be provided by private providers. This, it is claimed, reduces costs for the 
NHS and, since it is funded by tax-payers who also form the bulk of its users and the voting 
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population, this would seem to be beneficial3. However, this has been met by hostility from 
many quarters in spite of this. Nevertheless, most people who have the necessary money have 
not tried to opt out of the system and go on to another method of providing healthcare.  
This paper will accept the interpretation put on these cases by Sandel and Grant as 
being valid. It will be granted that these are examples of the corruption of the goods or 
services and the norms underlying them. Rather than debating them, we will instead focus on 
how this corruption and the reaction to it can be modelled within economics. In other words, 
the aim of this paper will be to find a proper analysis of the corruption of goods as a 
preliminary stage towards a meaningful discussion of the idea. 
 
3) On incentives and prosocial behaviour 
 Possibly the most typical attempt to explain phenomena such as these in economics is 
the model created by Benabou and Tirole (2006). On the face of it, this model may seem to fit 
the facts quite well. It explains the perverse effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic 
motivation, the effects of publicity on social behaviour, the creation of multiple norms of 
behaviour and the failure of social sponsors to appreciate reputational spillovers and fund 
social projects at the correct level. The model allows for a heterogeneous population and for 
multidimensional uncertainty on the part of members of that population. 
 Benabou and Tirole’s model allows each agent to make one choice relating to their 
degree of involvement in a social task. The agent’s choice of involvement depends on two 
elements: the direct benefit of involvement in the task and their reputational payoff. The 
former consists of the utility cost of being involved in the task C(a), the income involved, y, 
the level of participation aϵA and the preferences of the individual. These preferences are 
represented by two parameters va and vy which represent the individual’s preference for 
contributing to the social good and for money. It is assumed that v=(va,vy) differs within the 
population according to some random distribution. 
  The reputational payoff depends on the posterior expectations of an agent’s type v. This is 






and disinterested respectively. These are both modified by x, the visibility or salience of 
one’s actions. Defining µa=xγa and µy=xγy then we can summarise reputational preferences as 
µ=(µa,µy) where µ is also determined by a random distribution. This means that individuals in 
the population need to solve the following maximisation problem: 
max
∈
| , ,  
  The model can be further specified by imposing distributional assumptions onto v and µ, by 
defining C(a) more tightly and by decomposing va. The result is a signal extraction model 
where choices depend noisily on one’s preferences and where different configurations give 
more or less convincing representations of va. It should be noted that the heterogeneity of 
agents in the model is the main source of variation and the different configurations of v and µ 
drive most of the results. 
 The Benabou and Tirole model could be loosely characterised as a “behavioural” model in 
the sense that it uses variables that are based on behavioural, non- rational characteristics and 
attempts to come to conclusions that are compatible with the current state of psychological 
knowledge. However, in other ways, it remains fairly traditional. In particular, the main 
source of variation comes from the idea that agents can be split up into “types” chosen by 
nature (c.f. Harsanyi 1967, 1968a, 1968b). Different preferences are represented by different 
random selections from v and µ so that each selection represents a different person. It follows 
that a person’s preferences are “hard-wired” and that the degree of involvement in the social 
task depends on these fixed preferences. The various propositions in Benabou and Tirole look 
at the criteria at which people’s behaviour changes according to their fixed preferences. 
   A major criticism of the Benabou and Tirole model (and related ones) is precisely that these 
models do not allow an individual to change their minds. In other words, preferences are 
fixed and cannot be changed. However, the situations outlined by Sandel and Grant all 
involve an individual swapping from one situation to another and then changing their 
preferences as a result of this. The Wolfenschiessen nuclear waste repository, for example, 
involved the same set of villagers who initially agreed to the repository but later changed 
their mind when an extrinsic incentive was introduced. 
   It may be argued that the Benabou- Tirole model could model such changes if some of the 
parameters were changed such as those relating to “joy of giving” ua or “pure altruism” wa 
that can be used to define va in public goods contexts. However, it should be noted that, while 
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this could indeed be done it does not provide a theory of attitude change. These parameters 
do not correlate to any verified and reliable psychological process, so the way in which they 
change when attitudes change is unknown. All that will happen is a comparative-statics 
change in response to an exogenous change in parameters. Why this happens is unknown. 
  It follows that the Benabou-Tirole model and others modelled in the same way cannot 
provide a good model for how people can change from one interpretation of a situation to 
another. The same follows for other models of the same provenance. Any model where the 
variation in the model is based on variation of types within the population is going to have 
difficulty explaining how the individual members of the population are going to change their 
minds except in an ad hoc fashion. 
 
4) Other ideas on the corruption of goods 
In order to deal with the points made by Sandel and Grant we will have to think more 
coherently about the corruption of goods as a change in attitude. It is noticeable that in the 
literature there are few attempts to model how attitudes change in economic contexts. There 
seem to be two possibilities in the literature: one put forward by Hirsch (1977) and the other 
put forward by Stigler and Becker (1977). 
Hirsch postulated an extension of Lancaster’s idea (Lancaster 1966) that goods are 
consumed for the sake of their characteristics rather than for being goods themselves. Under 
this model, there is a consumption technology that converts the consumption of goods into 
characteristics that the consumer wants. Utility, therefore, represents preferences over 
characteristics rather than goods. Hirsch postulated that this could be extended to include 
social norms and the environmental conditions under which they are used. In such a case, the 
corruption of a good would take place when these social norms were undermined or when the 
environment of a good is changed. 
A similar, if more radical, version of this idea can be derived from the famous paper 
by Stigler and Becker (1977). Stigler and Becker were not concerned with the corruption of 
goods but rather with how to model seeming changes in tastes or preferences. Their argument 
was to insist that tastes should be modelled as remaining constant while all changes should be 
the result of changes in shadow prices. However, one can see an application of their argument 
to modelling corruption of goods. One way in which corruption of a good could be modelled 
9 
 
would be as a change in taste with respect to that good. Since this involves a change in tastes, 
which is unacceptable in modelling terms, it should instead be modelled as a change in a term 
within the utility function or, rather, a change in a term within the “production function” of 
each “commodity” within the utility function. A “commodity” in this case is actually a 
construct including all possible variables that could influence one’s utility. This includes the 
original good, the alternatives to that good plus human capital goods related to it as well as 
other variables. The utility function itself does not change but variables within the 
“commodity” do change. 
Stigler and Becker’s own chosen variable for changes in the commodity production 
function, human capital, is not much use in this case as there is the possibility that a person 
may change their mind back to their original state of mind. This would imply that acquired 
human capital is actually lost or forgotten. However, Stigler and Becker do allow for the 
possibility for other inputs influencing their commodity production function so this is not 
fatal for the application of their theory.  
Cowen (1989) has pointed out that the refusal of Stigler and Becker to allow a given 
utility function to change simply pushes the change back into the commodity production 
function or, if that is constant, into explaining exactly why one of the variables in the 
commodity production function varies. Stigler and Becker provide no explanation for this 
change. To do so would require specifying a function to explain the change in variables as 
well as the commodity production function. This would start an infinite regress of functions 
for specifying functions with no end in sight. It follows that there is no explanatory theory 
here; merely an endless chain of functions. Similarly Hirsch’s ideas simply rely on 
unexplained changes in norms. It could be argued that even if this was solved it would be 
hopeless because attitudes are human mental states and cannot be sensibly modelled as 
properties of the goods themselves.  
 
4) Attitudes, Representations and Actions 
In order to establish a sound framework for examining changes of attitudes within 
game theory we need to understand how we are going to interpret the games. To do this I will 
use the ideas laid out by Rubinstein (1991) in his article on the interpretation of game theory. 
Rubinstein suggested that the traditional model of game theory relied on the idea of games as 
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a set of decisions made over physical actions defined by a set of objective rules. A “strategy” 
in such a context is a plan of action by a player of the game over these physical actions. 
Rubinstein instead puts forward an interpretation of game theory as modelling 
individuals’ perceptions of real life social phenomena. Games, therefore, are the game 
theorist’s description of everything that players perceive as relevant to a specific situation. 
They do not necessarily conform to objective rules and, to be useful, they may not exactly 
reflect reality. A model should reflect the behaviour that a person would have if they were 
playing this particular game and the behaviour should be convergent with their behaviour in 
the real world situation. 
A similar argument is made by Lipman (1991) in the context of trying to build a 
model of limited rationality. For Lipman, all games should be interpreted from the point of 
view of the agent so that, in the end, an agent will make his optimal choice given his 
perception of a choice situation.  This means that agents can be assumed to be completely 
rational if one has correctly specified the choice set and preferences of the individual. 
However, this does not mean that the individual’s perception in any way conforms to reality- 
perceptions could be very badly misguided and bear absolutely no correspondence to the 
external world at all. 
One can see that there is a potentially interesting angle for explaining why a person 
may have differing attitudes in what physically may look like the same situation. If a person 
has differing perceptions of two physically similar situations then this may lead to that person 
having different attitudes towards the two situations since their preferences depend on those 
perceptions. Likewise, two people looking at the same physical situation may end up having 
different attitudes towards it for the same reason.  
The question then becomes: where do these “perceptions” come from? Rubinstein and 
Lipman are more concerned with modelling aspects of game theory than going into this 
question in any depth. Rubinstein in his 1991 paper4, for example, briefly speculates that the 
logic of perception is best examined by evolutionary biology and rejects analysis involving 
game theory but doesn’t give any arguments to support his case. I would argue that this is too 





norms, conventions, ethics and institutions that can be discovered via our perception but 
which are not studied by evolutionary biology. 
I would argue that the logical analogy of Rubinstein and Lipman’s notion of 
perception in psychology and cognitive science is that of the mental representation. A mental 
representation is an interpretation of the world held internally by a human being. This is an 
analogy, used in cognitive science, to representations held by information processing devices 
such as computers. Within cognitive science, representations are intimately connected with 
actions and it will be argued that this is crucial in formulating a theory of attitude change. 
It is assumed that the actions we are concerned with are intentional actions i.e. actions 
that are caused by the reasons for those actions. These reasons for actions have a belief 
component and a desire component (Davidson 1963). It will be assumed that these reasons 
can be converted into preferences where the belief component can be measured by subjective 
probabilities while the desire component can be measured by utilities. This conforms with 
conventional expected utility theory5,6. 
The next stage of the argument is due to Fodor (1987) who highlighted the ubiquity of 
so-called folk psychology in our reasoning. Folk psychology is the tendency to attribute an 
action by another person to mental states in that person. In other words, if a person carries out 
an intentional action then we tend to believe that it is because they have a reason to do it. If 
this is correct then we have to accept that there is a mental state behind every action which is 
a psychological disposition towards a specific content.  So, for example, if a person playing 
cricket swings his bat to hit a ball then onlookers assume that this is intentional and that he is 
attempting to score runs. The psychological disposition here is the determination of the player 
to score runs, while the content is the concept of scoring runs. 
Any mental state that has content is a representation and it is Fodor’s main contention 
that any intentional causation of an action must be accompanied by an explicit representation 
in the mind. As Fodor points out, this links in very closely with the cognitive picture of the 
mind. The cognitive picture of the mind makes a close analogy between the human mind and 
a computer. In order for a computer to operate, it needs a representation of the data from the 







requires exactly the same thing. Fodor notes that this analogy is probably the only one 
available and it is the one that fits in best with the folk psychological picture. 
Fodor tends to restrict the notion of representations to beliefs on the grounds that 
representations are about content and that content tends to be about what is the case. However 
Smith (1987) has pointed out that one need not restrict representations so tightly since content 
could be about how the world should be rather than just about how it is. In other words, one 
could be motivated to an action by one’s goals, which would involve rearranging the world to 
fit what one wants to happen. In order to do this, one would need a representation of one’s 
goals and desires.  
This all suggests that intentional actions are caused by reasons which split up into 
beliefs and desires as Davidson claims and this can be modelled by expected utility theory. 
However, we can go further and posit that our reasons for actions are bound up in mental 
representations that include both belief elements that show the world as it is and desire 
elements that represent the world as one wants it to be. A human being can potentially 
entertain a wide variety of representations, including many different representations of the 
same situation. We will assume that, given a choice set comprising a given number of 
possible actions, we can amalgamate the representations of each feasible action together into 
one consistent representation for the choice set. From now on, when we refer to 
“representations” we will refer to representations over a whole choice set and if we want to 
refer to content associated with individual actions we will simply refer to them as “reasons”. 
Since we are focussing on the effects of representations on attitudes, we will 
concentrate on changes to the payoffs and assume that the structure of the game, apart from 
payoffs, remains the same as before. It follows that a representation can be implemented in a 
game as an allocation of expected utilities to each player’s choice set. This may seem trivial 
since expected utilities are allocated to games all the time. However, it should be noticed that, 
unlike conventional decision theory, there is more than one possible representation for each 
choice set. It may be possible for the same choice set to have completely different allocations 
of utilities according to the representation selected. 
For the purposes of this paper we will assume that the payoffs in a game G are 
represented by utilities attached to the outcomes su for all u. Representations in games are 
assumed to be determined by the perceived attributes of a situation (c.f. Keeney & Raiffa 
1976). This means that, in each situation, a player is able to subjectively perceive it to have 
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certain qualities that can be measured by an external observer as attributes. It will be assumed 
that each representation will be determined by a vector of attributes which will be labelled x 
(or y for an alternative representation). Different representations can be formed by particular 
values of each attribute in the attribute vector. 
Each attribute is assumed to be monotonic with the utility function that determines the 
preferences of that attribute. If this is not the case then it is assumed that the attribute can be 
reformulated so that it is indeed monotonic (See Keeney & Raiffa ch. 2). Furthermore, it is 
also assumed, for simplicity, that the utility functions with attributes as arguments are twice 
differentiable in those attributes. Given the role of interpretation in forming representations 
and the subjectivity of attributes, it will be assumed that attribute vectors do not overlap. 
Even if an objective measure forms the basis for two subjective attributes in two different 
attribute vectors, it will be assumed that these count as separate attributes because of the 
potentially different interpretations applied to them. 
Attributes by themselves do not reflect the content and nature of representations in the 
cognitive science literature. This nature is inherently propositional (see Fodor 1987) so that 
different psychological attitudes are expressed as propositional attitudes. It would be useful 
to incorporate these ideas into the payoffs of games in order to explore the logical 
relationships between utilities and propositional attitudes. In order to do this, we will impose 
an extra layer of structure into utility functions in the form of predicates7. It is assumed that 
every value h, of attribute xn in the attribute vector x, has a corresponding simple predicate 
a(xhn) where xhn is a value of xn ϵ  x. These simple predicates simply describe the value of the 
attribute. From these simple predicates more complex predicates can be built up by using 
logical functions and relations. H(x)ϵ И(x) is a representation which is a predicate consisting 
of a concatenation of all the complex predicates held by a player with relation to the situation 
covered by the attribute vector x. И(x) represents the set of possible concatenated complex 
predicates that can be constructed with different values of the attribute vector x. A similar 
representation could be constructed for attribute vector y so that the representation is E(y) ϵ 
Д(y). It is assumed that there are no complex predicates that have attributes from more than 







One major assumption that will be made is that complex predicates should not be self-
contradictory nor should they contradict other complex predicates within the same 
representation. It should also be noted that the restrictions placed on attributes implicitly 
place some quite tight assumptions on the complex predicates that can be formed. To take an 
example, a complex predicate should not end up negating the direction of an attribute so that 
the attribute is no longer monotonic with the utility. 
Assume that each game G has an associated set of possible predicates denoted Ѵ. 
This set represents all possible complex predicates that could be constructed from all possible 
attribute vectors in set X that could be associated with the game. It follows that all H(x), E(y) 
ϵ Ѵ and x,y ϵX. Imagine that a set of actions in the game has resulted in an outcome sk. 
Suppose Mk  Ѵ is the set of possible complex predicates for each sk while XkX is the 
corresponding set of attribute vectors. The complex predicate qk ϵ Mk   is a disjunction of 
possible predicates that potentially could hold once sk has been selected in the game8. 
Different complex predicates qk for each option are formed depending on the values of the 
attributes in Xk. It is assumed that H(x) and qk overlap but are not subsets of each other9. In 
essence, representations operate by imposing restrictions on the predicates qk for each 
outcome sk.  
Finally, we assume that representations in the form of complex predicates can be 
incorporated into utilities and act as part of the structure of the utility function, translating the 
attributes into preferences. It will be assumed that individuals have preferences between 
predicates and that these are representable by a utility function. Each representation 
essentially creates its own utility function. A different representation over the same set of 
attributes (and the same external utility function) would result in a different set of utilities. 
This operationalises the idea that representations are essentially an allocation of utilities to 
outcomes. 
 In this paper we will be looking at utilities in multidimensional terms (see Weirich 










utilities- one across outcomes and one across attitudes. Since we are using attributes, we can 
use some of the concepts associated with multiattribute utility, such as utility independence, 
to govern relationships between utilities defined over different outcomes (or different 
interpretations of the same outcome). However, it will be assumed that the utilities 
themselves can be decomposed using preferential independence assumptions that hold 
between attitude propositions. Hence, utilities can be decomposed the same way and the parts 
compared with the similar parts of other decomposed utilities.  
We will start with the complex predicates that form representations. The predicates 
Hg(z) ϵ И(x) for all g and J(y) ϵ Д(y) are different representations over attributes z and y.  
 Definition 1: Predicates Hg(z) are preferentially independent of any predicate J(y) if the 
conditional preferences between different Hg(z) predicates given J(y) do not depend on J(y)10. 
However there are also the complex predicates across multiple attribute vectors formed by 
choices between options.  
Definition 2: Predicates qk ϵ Mk are preferentially independent of any predicate qg ∉ Mk if the 
conditional preferences between different predicates qk ϵ Mk given qg ∉ Mk do not depend on 
qg ∉ Mk. 
Various aspects of the game and its representations can be said to be preferentially 
independent of each other. It will be assumed, for example, that, for all k, qk and its 
complement ¬qk are both preferentially independent of each other. This fits in with the 
intuition that preferences for an outcome should not be influenced by aspects of the problem 
outside the outcome and vice versa. Likewise, a representation H(x) is assumed to be 
preferentially independent of ¬H(x) since the preferences between representations should not 
be influenced by external factors.  
 
5) The Selection of Representations 
One question that remains is how one representation is selected over another. How is 






another? Call the representation that is actually used to allocate the utilities in a choice set the 
active representation, labelled A(x) ϵ И(x) for an attribute vector x. There will be alternative 
representations of which we will focus on one, labelled D(y) ϵ Д(y) for attribute vector y.  
One issue is how many representations will be available for selection as the active 
representation. At first it might be thought that this is an impossible task to decide. There are, 
potentially, an infinite number of ways in which one can interpret a particular situation, even 
given a limited number of attributes, and one might be tempted to say that we are only 
constrained by our imagination.  
However, there are a variety of practical constraints. Firstly, we are boundedly 
rational, with limited time for formulating alternative representations in our mind. Our 
attention time is rationed and we have limited processing time for some of the more complex 
ideas. Secondly, we tend to look to other people for many of our ideas and we tend to adopt 
representations that have been formulated elsewhere. These tend to be limited in number 
because they have to be easily transmitted between individuals (see Sperber 1996 for a 
detailed analysis of this). Thirdly, we will tend to focus on those representations that fit in 
with our values and so reflect our priorities. Finally, representations have to make sense in 
terms of one’s own experience and knowledge. Given this, one would expect representations 
to be discrete from each other rather than a continuity. Arbitrarily changing the value of an 
attribute in a representation may make the whole representation incoherent either internally or 
with the external world. Within these constraints, it is likely that the number of 
representations available for choosing will be comparatively small. 
In such a situation, it would be necessary to decide which should be the active 
representation for the individual. From the individual’s point of view, this would mean that 
she has to select one of these representations as being the “best” in some sense and then use 
the representation to assign utilities to perceived moves in the game. In other words, we have 
to find a selection mechanism for representations. This search is made hard by the fact that 
we still know comparatively little about how the mind works. However, there are many 
possibilities that can be at least partially rejected on general principles. 
One of these is that the selection mechanism is essentially unconscious i.e. we do not 
select representations through an exercise of will but by some unknown process in our mind 
of which we are not aware. This possibility seems very attractive because, sometimes, we do 
indeed seem to assume one particular interpretation of the world without actually thinking 
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about it. The existence of habits and inherited taboos that persist in the face of alternative 
ideas is sufficient evidence for this. 
 However, this surely cannot cover all cases. There are many times when one 
considers one’s position consciously and tries to understand what is going on. Indeed, one 
could define “understanding” in this manner: the fitting of a representation to a particular 
situation. Given that trying to understand something is a conscious action, it follows that at 
least some of the situations where an individual selects representations must be the result of 
conscious processes. Furthermore, one could argue that any action that is unconscious cannot 
be modelled and cannot be analysed as a change in mind. 
Another possibility is that the selection mechanism is in some sense automatic or 
unintentional. This would mean that there is a conscious process whereby the mind would 
select one representation over another. In a sense, this must have some truth in it. Visual 
perception and the understanding of visual perception by the brain are, by and large, 
processes that we do consciously but that we do not deliberately control. However, the results 
of visual or other sense perception cannot be the only content of representations. For 
example, in social situations there are elements that simply cannot be perceived through the 
senses but must be understood by use of our reasoning powers. Examples of this are social 
institutions, norms, conventions, taboos etc. None of these can be perceived directly but must 
be deduced from visual or other signs. 
Given that at least some selection mechanisms, including most involved in social 
situations, must be the result of intentional reasoning, one possibility is that representations 
are best selected by a comparison of the beliefs in a given representation. This would mean 
that the representation which one judges to have the highest subjective probability would be 
the one that is taken on by the individual. It is certainly true that belief forms a major part in 
the selection of representations. One such model that has been developed is that of Rubinstein 
(1998) who builds a model of perceptrons based around the idea that one’s beliefs are limited 
and that one only gains a partial picture of the external world. Rubinstein sees beliefs as 
being actively formed by agents as part of an optimisation process in which agents select 
their knowledge partition, given their own constraints on information processing. This model 
is quite limited, in that it focusses on rougher information partitions imposed on a continuous 
variable, but it shows how such models could be developed. 
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However, this cannot be the whole story. It ignores the role of wishful thinking and 
self-deception in human affairs i.e. the fact that sometimes the content of one’s representation 
is more consistent with what one wants to be the case than what is actually the case. It also 
ignores situations where evidence for any representation is lacking but there is an 
overwhelming sense of the importance of a particular representation. Also not taken into 
account is the fact that people judge information according to values such as objectivity and 
accuracy (Williams 2002). In general, more accurate or objective information is judged to be 
more important i.e. is more highly valued than inaccurate or non-objective information. 
Values tend to enter into one’s desires rather than beliefs so in all cases one’s desires have an 
influential role in selecting representations. 
The proposal that I wish to make in this paper is that the best way of modelling the 
selection mechanism is as the result of an autonomous choice made by the agent. In other 
words, representations are chosen in much the same way that one chooses goods. Human 
beings are self-aware and are able to analyse their own beliefs and desires to see whether they 
fit into a given situation. In the process of this analysis they need to make a judgement as to 
which representation best fits the situation and to choose between those representations that 
are available. While there are some restrictions on how we can model these choices, I believe 
that there is no intrinsic problem with this method.  
I would contend that this is not an unusual way of thinking. Whenever we go into a 
new situation we are always looking for clues as to how we should behave and also what sort 
of situation it is. If we visit a foreign country we try to find out and understand the social 
structures, institutions and mores of that country so that we can accommodate them and not 
cause embarrassment. We then work out what our understanding is of the culture and adapt to 
it i.e. we choose the representation that conforms most to our beliefs and desires. Although 
this may seem plausible in some respects, there are some objections that may be made against 
these ideas. I will first of all explain the theory in more detail and then focus on some of the 
objections in the discussion section. 
One necessary concept for such a theory is that of a mental action (Proust 2001, 
Geach 1957, O’Brien & Soteriou 2009)11. A mental action is an intentional action by the 
mind that has as its goal another mental process. Examples of this are easy to find. A person 





electrician tries to work out the course of electric wiring in a wall. In all these cases nothing 
physical is happening but in each case the processes have goals that are intentional and are 
not the result of unconscious thought. If, for example, a person succeeds in remembering 
where his keys are then the action has been successful but not otherwise. 
Given that mental actions resemble ordinary physical actions, they share the 
characteristics of physical actions. Since they are intentional then they are caused by reasons 
comprising beliefs and desires (using Davidson’s (1963) analysis) and, given our use of the 
expected utility model, these can be measured using probabilities and utilities respectively. 
The mental action that we are interested in is that of the mind fitting a particular 
representation to the situation in which the agent finds themselves (Proust 2009) and we will 
use the phrase “mental action” to refer to this type of action from now on.  
It can be seen, therefore, that representations can be modelled within game trees 
where there are two types of actions. The set of actions in a game G therefore will consist of 
physical actions bm ϵ b and mental actions Tj ϵ T. Mental actions in these games will denote 
the change of representation for all outcomes subsequent to Tj. Throughout the rest of this 
paper we will assume that a player chooses Tj, triggering representation A(x) and chooses 
actions which lead to an outcome sk with associated predicate qk. The utility which we will 
analyse will be that both A(x) and qk occur i.e. the conjunction of the two predicates: 
(A(x)qk). This indicates that the effects of both the representation and the outcome are being 
considered within the utility function. However we will also impose the condition that A(x) 
and qk are additively separable to reflect the idea that they are independent of each other in 
that A(x) is created by the player while qk is a reflection of the possibilities logically available 
to the player if sk is chosen. 
 It should be noted that how mental actions enter into games may vary from game to 
game. Conventional games have no explicit mental actions since they do not change 
representations- the mental action actually occurs before the game starts when a 
representation is chosen to fix the utilities for that game. Other games may involve a mental 
action and physical action happening simultaneously- such as when one goes through the 
ritual for converting to another religion. However, quite often, mental and physical actions 
may be separate in time within the game. 
Following Rubinstein, such games will involve replicating the individuals’ subjective 
perception of a situation. In some games, different mental actions will result in different 
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choice sets for physical actions whereas in others the choice set is effectively replicated for 
different mental actions- just the utilities of the outcomes change even though, physically, 
nothing else has. In other games, most of the game tree will operate under one representation 
but a mental action will give the opportunity to change to another representation in a 
particular part of the tree. 
Finally, the use of representations automatically implies the use of extensive form 
games rather than normal form games. This is because there is a natural time difference 
between the choosing of a representation and the subsequent choosing of an option from the 
basic game. This is necessary because the choice of a representation informs the 
interpretation of the situation that results in preferences over options in the choice set. 
Representations must be chosen first so that options can be chosen with coherent 
preferences12. It follows from this that we will have a preference for using extensive form 
refinements when looking at equilibrium in these games. 
To some, this would seem to be a recipe for disaster. Surely a change in 
representations halfway through a game will result in inconsistency? If one changes 
representations then this results in changes to utilities so that utilities as perceived in one part 
of the game tree will not be valued in the same way in other parts. As Rubinstein has pointed 
out (Rubinstein 1991), if one wants to model the subjective perceptions of individuals in 
games then there will always be some inconsistencies. However, this still leaves the problem 
of how we can analyse such games. The next section will discuss this point.   
 
6) Conditional Utilities and Representations 
As constructed, the framework given here has problems that need to be solved. 
Assuming that representations can change partway through a game, how can a player come to 
an overall assessment as to which strategies are the best to play? In essence, a player will 
have to put himself in the position of actually having that representation and seeing what his 
utilities are given that representation. This suggests that we will have to analyse this situation 







subjunctive conditional utilities and indicative conditional utilities. Both are necessary to 
analyse the problem of inconsistency. 
Another issue is how exactly one should judge the representations themselves. Are 
representations close to reality? Do they have high values for accuracy and objectivity? Do 
they reflect the importance attached to various values by the player? These issues do not 
necessarily link in with the utility of individual outcomes but could be common to all 
outcomes following from the relevant mental action. 
The theory of conditional utilities we will use here is based (with some changes) on 
that of Weirich (1980). In his view, conditional utilities relate to the utility, given a condition, 
of an outcome supposing that that outcome occurs. It is not seen as the utility of a 
conditional. Weirich holds that there are different ways of supposing the conditions but that 
the two most fruitful are suppositions for indicative conditionals and for subjunctive 
conditionals. In the former case one looks at what happens if a condition does hold compared 
with the latter where one looks at what happens if a condition were to hold. 
The difference may at first sight seem slight but the effects are profound in the game 
utilities presented here. For indicative conditional utilities, one’s preferences for an outcome 
are determined given that one has already accepted the impact of the representation on the 
outcome. For subjunctive conditional utilities, one imagines what it would be like to have that 
representation. This means that there could be a considerable difference in the utilities 
assigned to a particular outcome, depending on whether one is assessing the game tree before 
playing it or whether one has actually played it. 
In Weirich’s notation, if we have a consequent L and condition N then the condition 
has a subjunctive conditional utility denoted by U*(L ˄ N), where both L and N are supposed 
at the same time. The corresponding indicative conditional utility is denoted by U(L/N) 
where L is supposed given that N actually holds. The two types of utility are assumed to be 
equal when U*(L˄N)=U(L/N). It should be noted that the indicative utility U(L/N) is similar 
to the conditional utility defined in Keeney and Raiffa (1976)for attributes and it will be 
defined in that sense here. Weirich assumes that the subjunctive conditional utility is the 
“normal” way of assessing utilities in decision problems and games given the use of 
subjunctive reasoning throughout a game (c.f. Binmore 1987). 
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Another aspect of conditional utilities that needs to be discussed is the nature of the 
condition itself. Using the notation introduced in the previous section, simply assuming that 
the indicative conditional utility is formulated as U(A(x)˄qk/A(x)) ignores whether A(x) 
imposes any restrictions on qk (Weirich 1980). The mere choice of Tj and the taking on of 
A(x) as one’s representation does not say anything about the causal link between the 
representation and the subsequent outcome. It follows that it would make more sense to make 
the restriction on qk more explicit. Hence a better formulation would be U(A(x)˄qk/A(x)→qk) 
where “→” represents a conditional that imposes A(x) as a restriction on qk13. Three 
assumptions made about the conditional A(x)→qk are that, for all k where sk is a successor to 
Tj, it is preferentially independent of its complement, for k=i the restriction A(x)→qi is the 
only one that is relevant to the outcome si and  A(x) conditioned on a condition other than 
A(x)→qi  is not relevant to the utility of si. This holds because we do not wish to add the 
complication of analysing what happens when the content of one outcome enters into the 
utility of another, such as when under the influence of regret ( e.g. Loomes & Sugden 1982). 
In addition we do not want to consider any influence external to the outcomes apart from that 
of A(x)→qk. 
Finally, we need to think about that part of A(x) that does not imply qk for any k. For 
this part, we will assume that the subjunctive conditional utility is always equal to the 
indicative conditional utility. This is because this is the part of A(x) that is unavoidable for 
the player and hence includes elements of A(x) that are common to all options and outcomes 
succeeding Tj. This would include part of the utility of A(x) that is involved in judging 
whether it is an appropriate representation to hold or not. Assuming that the subjunctive and 
indicative conditional utilities are equal allows us to assume that this part of the utility of 














This allows us to prove the following proposition that decomposes the utility function 
of U(A(x)qi): 
Proposition 1: If the subjunctive and indicative conditional utilities are equivalent then the 
utility of the outcome si which is subsequent to the mental action Tj can be expressed as: 
∧ ∀ : → | → | →  
when expressed as indicative conditional utilities or: 
∧ ∗ ∀ ∧ ∗  
when expressed as subjunctive conditional utilities. 
(Proof in appendix) 
Here U* represents the utility function for subjunctive utility functions whereas U represents 
the utility function for the indicative utility functions. 
Taking the indicative conditional utilities first, the first term on the right hand side is the 
indicative form of the utility of the representation when we ignore the effect of it on options 
in the game. This would include the player’s judgement of whether the representation A(x) 
fits with the situation being assessed. The first term on the right hand side of the second 
equation is the same idea expressed in terms of subjunctive utilities. These represent the 
unavoidable utility component as explained above and would include an element that 
represents the “fit” of the representation to the outside world. 
The second term on the right hand side of the first equation represents the utility of the 
representation that emerges from consideration of playing outcome si. This is where the 
importance of the representation is entwined with the playing of a particular option. In other 
words, the playing of a particular option justifies the holding of a particular representation 
while the playing of another option (i.e. one that undermines the whole purpose of the 
representation) would not do so. This could also be seen as part of the option-specific “fit” to 
a situation. 
The final term on the right hand side of the first equation is the utility of the outcome si. It 
should be noted that this assumes that the utility is fully determined by the representation and 
there is no separate influence from elsewhere. This term, combined with the second term is 
equivalent to the second term in the second equation which is the subjunctive evaluation of 
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the outcome. This is the avoidable part of the utility component which is so-called because it 
can be avoided by choosing another option. 
This proposition suggests that we can model multirepresentational games as a two 
stage decision process within an extensive form game with the utilities of the representation 
and the chosen outcome summed at the end. Once the subjunctive and indicative conditional 
utilities are equal to each other the game can be treated as an ordinary game, using ordinary 
game- theoretic solution concepts. 
 One interesting aspect of this is that, once the individual is in equilibrium, he is in 
equilibrium in both physical actions and in representations. The individual is not free to 
simply change his interpretation of the world at whim because to do so would be to decrease 
his expected utility. Naturally, the individual could acquire another, third, representation but 
this would change the nature of the game by adding another mental action. Nevertheless, this 
new game could be solved in a similar way and one of the representations would become 
fixed in the new equilibrium. Allowing for an agent to interpret a situation within a game 
does not lead to theoretical anarchy but instead explains the stability of these interpretations 
in the form of equilibrium representations.  
One question that can be asked is under what conditions an individual’s subjunctive 
conditional utility will converge on their indicative conditional utility.  This is a complex 
question that will have several different answers depending on the formulation and number of 
representations in the game. We will focus on the total avoidable utility in the game i.e. 
U(A(x)˄qi/A(x)→qi) and the corresponding subjunctive utility. For the purposes of this paper 
we will simplify issues so that there are just two representations A(x) and B(y) and that these 
are the only two possible representations in a player’s mind. B(y) is constructed from the set 
D(y) mentioned above by deleting the set C  D(y) where C comprises those complex 
predicates of D(y) that contradict complex predicates in A(x).  
This allows us to formulate the notion of a subjunctive conditional within our 
notation. If a player is coming to a representation A(x) that is not currently active then they 
must have another active representation that we will assume is D(y). According to Papineau 
(2012 p. 116), the new information represented by A(x) is assessed by taking away all 
predicates that contradict A(x) thus creating B(y) and then adding A(x) to our stock of 
knowledge. This creates a new predicate: Q(Tj,x,y)=A(x)B(y). Q(Tj,x,y) therefore relates to 
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the perception of the player when assessing the game rather than actually playing the game. It 
follows that the subjunctive conditional utility is denoted by U*(A(x)qi  (Q(Tj,x,y)→qi)) 
where (Q(Tj,x,y)→qi) is the adjusted condition for the subjunctive conditional15. 
Define the constant vectors x0 , x1  as instances of x such that:  
∀ , ∈ ⋀	 ∉ ↔  
and 
∀ , ∈ ⋀	 ∉ ↔  
These are the minimal and maximal exemplars of x, and we can similarly define 
exemplars of y, labelled y0 and y1.  
This allows us to prove the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Assuming mutual utility independence between the attribute vectors x and y 
and that the prospects: 
(A(x)qi  (Q(Tj,x1,y0)→qi)) with probability π;  (A(x)qi  (Q(Tj,x0,y0)→qi)) with 
probability (1-π)    and 
 (A(x)qi  (Q(Tj,x1,y1)→qi)) with probability π;  (A(x)qi  Q(Tj,x0,y1)→qi)) with 
probability (1-π) 
are indifferent for all probabilities π then the player will hold the correct representation A(x) 
and the indicative conditional utility U(A(x)qi /A(x)→qi) will be equal to the subjunctive 
utility U*(qi). 
 (proof in appendix) 
The proposition above shows the link between subjunctive and indicative utilities, 
demonstrating how they can be achieved in the particular circumstance where there are two 
representations. However, it may be argued that there may be many circumstances where 
equality between the two types of conditional utility do not hold. It may be legitimately asked 






utility U(A(x)qi /A(x)→qi) is monotonic with the subjunctive conditional utility U(A(x)qi 
˄ (Q(Ti,x,y)→qi)). This implies that the former has the same preference ordering as the latter 
so the difference between the two utilities won’t affect which option is chosen. 
The conditions for this can be seen in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: If two representations defined by the attribute vectors x and y are mutually 
utility independent then x and y are complements if and only if U*(A(x)qi Q(Ti,x,y)→qi)) 
is monotonically increasing in U(A(x)qi /A(x)→qi). 
(Proof in Appendix) 
If it is possible to observe the attribute vectors and their relationship to each other then it 
follows that one can predict whether or not it matters if the subjunctive conditional utility is 
aligned with the indicative conditional utility. 
 
7) Discussion 
One immediate objection that springs to mind is that this seems to put forward a 
bizarre view of how representations are selected. If one chooses which representation is most 
appropriate then why not choose one that suits oneself? Why go to the trouble of determining 
the accuracy of a representation and then operating within the (possibly inconvenient) 
confines of this representation when one could maximise one’s utility by imagining a 
representation that best suits one’s own tastes? 
The primary response to this is to point out the implicit assumption made by this 
objection. It assumes that people are self-interested in every possible way so that they are 
willing to warp their view of reality to fit in with their self-interest. However, the model in 
this paper explicitly does not assume universal self-interest. This means that we are able to 
assume, with Williams (2002), that accuracy is seen as important i.e. it has value and that this 
value is incorporated in the utility function. Self-interest and accuracy do sometimes go 
together but quite often they diverge- one’s plans are often blocked by “inconvenient facts”. 
Furthermore, the values assigned to representations need not be self-interested. Values 
indicate importance and this need not imply that something is only important to oneself. 
However, on the other hand, we would not want to exclude the role of wishful thinking so in 
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this model it is possible that people may solely follow their own interests. Wishful thinking, 
for example, occurs when accuracy is not seen as being valuable and when one’s personal 
desires overwhelm the facts on the ground. 
In spite of the above considerations, it is still a valuable question to ask just how 
accurate one would expect humans to be. There is an evolutionary argument to expect respect 
for accuracy to be widespread. Any set of individuals who do not value accuracy are highly 
likely to find themselves in dangerous situations where they cannot evaluate properly what is 
happening. Such people are liable to be killed off, leaving those who value accuracy with a 
high likelihood of surviving. This does not mean that wishful thinking is driven to extinction- 
in non-lethal situations and, in situations where one’s decisions do not necessarily have an 
impact on oneself, it would survive but the habit of valuing accuracy would give an 
advantage. There is room for wishful thinking and self-deception in human society but one 
would not expect it to be pervasive. 
Another, similar, objection relates to the fact that a decision tree approach would 
result in a person aggregating their expected utilities in their terminal outcomes in a game 
tree. It could be argued that this is a very odd way of doing things because the utilities 
resulting from the choice of representation are combined with the utilities assigned to 
outcomes as a result of adopting the representation. There is no privileged status for the 
representational utilities so one could have a representation chosen by the latter utilities 
overriding the former.  
Again, this need not be a problem. The “fit” of the representation to the external 
world is not trivial in utility terms. To take a fanciful example: suppose a person is working 
all day earning money as a typist. He is faced with a decision as to whether carry on working 
in the job or not. He has two representations: one is realistic and results in a decision to carry 
on working as this is the only way in which he can support himself. The second 
representation is fantastical in that it assumes a fairy is going to endow the typist with a lot of 
money so that he doesn’t need to work ever again. While the utility from the money acquired 
in the second representation may be enormous, it would be swamped by the expected utility 
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gained from the comparative “fit” of the first representation and the typist’s valuation of 
accuracy16. 
There may, indeed, be cases where, for example, the overall fit of two competing 
representations is so low that the utilities of the outcomes are decisive. It may be the case that 
this decisive advantage is the result of the importance of the representation as expressed 
through a particular option being played i.e. the option-specific “fit”. In this case there is no 
problem since representations’ utilities still have a decisive influence over the choice between 
representations. If, however, these are also low then one has little real evidence for the reality 
of the two representations or one values accuracy at such a low level that the outcomes are as 
good a way of judging which representation to choose as anything else. 
 Another case, which will occur in the examples, is if the fit of the competing 
representations are both comparatively high, in both overall and option-specific terms, so that 
there is little to choose between them purely in terms of the fit. However, I would argue that 
this is not a problem; if both of one’s representations fit the world well then one would make 
a choice by looking at which is the most internally attractive in terms of beliefs and desires. 
Another obvious objection to the representations framework is that when this is 
conceptualised as a game, one’s opponent cannot see which move has been made as it occurs 
inside the opponent’s mind. However, there are three possible responses to this objection. 
The first response is that hidden moves are easily modelled in game theory through the use of 
non-singular information sets. The fact that an agent does not know how another agent has 
moved is easily modelled in an extensive form game. It should be noted, however, that it is 
assumed that all possible representations chosen by the other agent are known even if one 
does not know the specific representation that was chosen. 
The second response is that, for various reasons, the representation chosen will be 
“obvious”. To take an extreme example, a person is unlikely to have a representation that will 
result in him wanting to drinking poison. In other examples, “obviousness” may be culturally 
specific. In China, for example, it is generally assumed that Chinese people are able to use 






things. For example, people tend to find furry animals to be more “cute” than (say) reptiles 
and may be more likely to pet them. 
The third response derives from Frank’s (1988) work on emotions. According to 
Frank, emotions act as signalling devices because they are difficult (although not impossible) 
to fake. If a representation causes emotional arousal in an agent then the other agent may be 
able to detect that emotion and distinguish which representation their opponent has chosen. 
Emotion is costly for the person involved and, being difficult to fake, acts as a commitment 
device that makes the signal reliable. One would expect this method to be used quite often in 
personal interactions. 
Another issue relating to representations as game moves is that of mixed strategies. 
We have assumed that individuals are rational in the sense that they do not accommodate 
contradictions. As a result of this, an agent would not be willing to hold two contradictory 
representations at the same time. However, with the traditional interpretation of mixed 
strategies this is precisely what does happen. Given equal expected utilities for 
representations then one will randomise over the two representations even if they have 
elements in them that contradict each other. 
However, this need not be a major problem in games and mixed equilibria can still be 
used. This is because there are alternative interpretations of the mixed equilibrium concept 
that can be used instead. One alternative interpretation was put forward by Aumann (1987) 
where he interpreted a mixed strategies equilibrium as being a state where players’ subjective 
probabilities were over their opponents’ chances of playing one pure strategy (or 
representation) over another rather than randomising one’s own strategy. Another alternative 
is to follow evolutionary game theory where a mixed strategy is interpreted as the proportions 
of a population who are playing a given pure strategy (or representation). 
 
8) Representations, corruption and consent  
Having outlined how representations can be modelled in a game, we will need to give 
examples of how this may be done in more concrete situations. Fortunately, as has been 
described, representations can be modelled in much the same way as actions in a game, if one 
allows for the facts that they are largely hidden from opponents, that one cannot use the 
traditional view of mixed strategies, that games are interpreted as the agent’s perception of a 
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given situation and if it is assumed that subjunctive and indicative conditional utilities are 
equivalent.  
Furthermore, we need to link our discussion of representations to the corruption of 
goods. We have rejected the idea that this can be modelled as a type based analysis as 
suggested by Benabou and Tirole (2006). This type of analysis ignores the role of human 
decision making in adopting representations and has no explanation as to why players may 
change their minds. Any corruption of a good, therefore, is better modelled as a decision by 
an agent that the good does not have the same value as it had before. 
In this section, we will model corruption of goods using psychological game theory 
(Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti 1989) where fundamental deviations from self-interest17 
are modelled on an individual’s beliefs about their opponent’s actions. It follows that 
differences in utility resulting from differences in representation will be determined by one’s 
own beliefs in one’s opponent’s actions.  
In discussing the modelling of representations we will model three examples derived 
from the discussion in section 2. The examples given will be simple in form but they will 
highlight some of the issues mentioned previously in this paper. The first case is that of 
consent (Peter 2004). The example given was of the NHS in the United Kingdom and the 
change from public to private providers of healthcare. The second case is that of the Swiss 
nuclear waste repository where individuals approve of having a nuclear waste repository 
without incentives but reject it when they have it. The final case relates to bribery and 
whether a person will accept a bribe or not. 
The first case is modelled as follows: the government decides on what sort of service 
(e.g. private or public) is provided for healthcare. There are three possible options (labelled 
a,b- two treatments and e- an exit option) that the second player, an individual consuming the 









Figure 1: Healthcare game 
In the diagram above we can see that S1 and S2 represent public and private provision 
of the service respectively. S1 is the “status quo” option in that it is assumed that the service 
has been public for a long time and so the second player’s reaction to this style of service has 
settled down on one active representation, which we will denote R1. From the viewpoint of 
player 2 there is a (1-r) probability of S1 being chosen and an r probability of S2 being 
chosen. There are two possible representations held by player 2: R1 and R2. R1 is the active 
representation that is held when public service is continued while R2 is a possible alternative 
representation that holds when private service is imposed. When private service is imposed, 
the second player has to make a choice between the two representations and then, conditional 
on each representation, a choice between the treatments provided. 
It is assumed that the government approves of the change in service and so prefers 
people to have private service rather than public service but doesn’t like it when people exit 
from the service altogether. The individual’s utilities are controlled by the representation they 
have of the situation. We will assume that individuals always prefer treatment a to b and both 
of these to the exit option. In addition, the avoidable utility does not vary according to the 
importance of a representation when an option is played. 
Under representation R2, player 2 has utility payoffs depending on the player’s 
expectation of r, r*. In each action, after playing R2, part of the payoff is composed of kr* 





















that if kr* is high then the representation R2 is deemed to be a good “fit” to the situation. The 
“fit” of R1 is normalised to zero in this model. r* is seen as part of the “fit” because the 
change from R1 to R2 is triggered by player 1’s choice of S2. The choice of S2 causes player 
2 to reassess his values and beliefs in response. The avoidable utility varies between the 
actions with action a having a payoff of 4r*, action b having a payoff of 3r* and action e (the 
exit option) having a payoff of 2r*. This part of the payoff (apart from e) can be seen as a 
perceived future decline in the quality of healthcare. 
It follows that r*=r=1 is the only possible probability assignment for any 
psychological subgame perfect equilibrium. This can be seen by realising that action a 
dominates the actions b and e for player 2 throughout the game. The point r*=r=0 is not 
consistent since it produces an equilibrium {S2,R1,a} which cannot occur if r=0 . The mixed 
equilibrium would be where r*=10/(k+4). This does not exist if k<6 and is the same as 
r*=r=1 if k=6. However, if k>6 then this creates a mixed equilibrium in a situation where 
player 1 will always play S2 (because action a is always chosen and actions a following S2 
always have a payoff of 20 for player 1 while the action a following S1 has a payoff of 10). 
This means that the mixed equilibrium is also not consistent. 
It follows that one can analyse the game purely in terms of the unavoidable utility k. 
If k > 6 then a play of {S2,R2,a} becomes the psychological subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the game. If k < 6 then {S2,R1,a} is subgame perfect while k=6 involves player 2 being 
indifferent between the two. In both cases, whether the service remains in the public sector or 
not, the type of treatment chosen remains the same and, from the point of view of physical 
actions, there is no difference. 
However, this should not be taken as approval of the system under which treatments 
are provided. If k > 6 and R2 is played then the avoidable utility attached to the treatments 
has actually gone down i.e. the change in system for providing the treatments has “corrupted” 
them. The reason for choosing R2 is because of its perceived fit to the situation (with 
unavoidable utility of kr*), not because the treatments available look better. However, the 
individual has not chosen the exit option since it still looks like a poor alternative within the 
game. This, as Peter (2004) points out, does not imply consent. Indeed, if a survey was taken 
then considerable dissent would probably be expressed. This means that “voice” is a 




It should also be noted that from the point of view of the outside observer, this game 
would seem to be very simple. If we ignore the change in supplier then the same treatments 
are being produced under public or private provision. One may see this simply as a straight 
choice between two treatments and an exit option. We can also include the government’s 
choice of two types of service but this does not allow us to see the thought processes inside 
an individual’s head. This can only be done with representations. 
   Case 2 revolves around the situation of the Swiss state wanting to place a nuclear 
waste repository in the village of Wolfenschiessen. In the game given in figure 2, the 
investigators either offer (O) or do not offer (DO) money for the villagers to accept the 
repository. The status quo situation is that the villagers are not offered money. In this case 
they are assumed to subscribe to their original representation (labelled R1) and immediately 
decide whether to accept (A) or decline (D) the waste depository. If the villagers are offered 
money then they make a choice between two new representations: R2 or R3. R2 is a 
representation where player 2 has monetary payments as motivation to accept the depository, 
while R3 is a representation where monetary payments, while motivating to a certain extent, 
also cause a reaction against them. When they have chosen their representation, they accept 
or decline the repository.  
 
 
Figure 2: Nuclear Waste Game 
 
It should be noted here that the unavoidable utility derived from the “fit” of the 















representations are seen as equally plausible as a good fit for the situation and so that the 
variable k used in the last example would be normalised to zero for all three representations. 
The main effect of the different representations is to change the balance of utility payoffs i.e. 
the avoidable utility between A and D. This change can be seen as a result of the perceived 
importance of the representations when A or D are played as well as the utilities induced by 
the representations. 
It is assumed here that the offering of money will result in a change in representation 
whatever happens. For player 2, there is a difference between what happens to the payoffs if 
the repository is accepted. Under R1, player 2 will gain an avoidable utility of 5+z(1-q*) 
reflecting a situation where the government is relying on people’s goodwill to gain 
acceptance. The decision not to pay is reflected in the payoffs. By contrast, under R2, the 
initial baseline utility of 5 is supplemented by 6 to give an overall utility of 11. Under R3, 
there is yet another change whereby for player 2, the additional utility from the payoff of 6 
when the depository is accepted is offset by a utility loss of vq*. This utility loss is 
transformed into a utility gain when the repository is rejected.  Both v and z are constants 
where z is the initial level of social goodwill, while v represents a combination of outrage at 
the money payment and a rejection of the social good. It should be noted here that, when 
player 1 decides to pay the residents, the payment represents a utility cost of 6 but this is 
partly made up by a preference for using monetary incentives by a factor of 1 across the 
board. 
There are three psychological subgame equilibria possible in this game, depending on 
the values of the parameters. There are no mixed equilibria in this game. This is because, for 
player 1, if DO is chosen then player 2 can choose either A or D. If A is selected then, for 
player 1, the payoff of 20 dominates the payoffs from any choices made by player 2 after O is 
chosen. If D is selected after DO then, for player 1, the payoff of 0 is dominated by the 
payoffs from any choices made by player 2 after O is chosen. 
The pure strategies psychological subgame perfect equilibria depend on the values of 
z and v.  If q*=q=0 and z>5 then the government doesn’t offer money and the individual 
accepts the depository. If q*=q=1 then there are two possible outcomes depending on the 
value of v. If v>1 then there is an equilibrium with strategy profile {O, R3, D}. If v<1 then 
there is an equilibrium with strategy profile {O, R2, A}. It follows that this model 
demonstrates how the various outcomes can emerge with different representations. 
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In a similar manner to case 1, to the outside observer, the decision looks very simple- 
the villagers simply have to choose between accepting the waste depository and rejecting it 
but the use of representations shows that there is actually a rich underlying decision process. 
Also, in the same way as with case 1, the representations are visible to the villager making 
the decision but is not visible to the state so that the state cannot “see” whether one 
representation is chosen or another.  
The final case focuses on the issue of bribery as discussed by Grant (2012). We will assume 
in this case that there is a judge (player 1) who has been offered a bribe in order to carry out a 
particular judicial decision. We will model this as a choice by a particular judge as to whether 
they should see the bribe as a commercial transaction (and choose R1) or as a moral issue (in 
which case they will follow R2). It should be noted that we are not assuming absolute 
morality here. Given enough money the judge will be won over or show weakness of will18. 
We will also assume, as with the second example, that the unavoidable utility (including the 
overall “fit” of the representations) does not affect the outcome in this example. However, the 
choice of mental action will be determined by the importance of the representations when 



































The choice between R1 and R2 is hidden from the briber (player 2) and so there is an 
information set covering the starting nodes of the next decision. This is the decision as to 
whether to bribe the judge (choosing B) or not (choosing NB). p is the probability of 
assuming the representation R1. v is a constant representing a norm against bribery. If it is 
decided not to bribe the judge then the briber gets a payoff of -1, while the judge gets a 
payoff of 0 if they are corrupt (i.e. choosing R1) but v(1-q*) if not corrupt (i.e. choosing R2). 
q* is the expected value of q- the probability that the briber chooses B. If a decision is made 
to bribe then the judge has to decide whether to accept the bribe (choosing A) or not 
(choosing N).  If the judge accepts the bribe then he gets a payoff of 2.If a bribe is not 
accepted then, given the possibility of getting caught, the briber gets -4 while the judge gets 
zero. Finally, under representation R2 there is a utility value vq* that reduces the utility value 
of accepting a bribe if offered and boosts his utility if it is refused. 
 Obviously this model is complex and will have different equilibria depending on the values 
of v.  We will focus on the pure strategies equilibria. There are two possible situations 
depending on whether v ≤ 1, where only one psychological sequential equilibrium is possible, 
and v>1 where three psychological sequential equilibria are possible. The former can be seen 
by realising that B will be chosen by the briber if the payoff is greater than that for NB. On 
the left hand side playing B will always result in A being chosen since 2>0 for the judge. This 
means that playing B on the left hand side always results in a payoff of 12 for the briber. On 
the right hand side the payoff for B depends on whether 2-vq*is greater or less than vq*. If 2-
vq* is greater then the payoff for the briber is 12 so playing B dominates playing NB for the 
briber on both sides. Therefore there is one psychological sequential equilibrium where 
q=q*=1 and the strategy profile {R1,B,A} is played. 
  Where v>1 there are three psychological equilibria depending on the value of p. If p<3/16 
then NB will be selected on both sides so q=q*=0 and, since v(1-q*)>0, a strategy profile of 
{R2, NB} will be played. If p> 3/16 then B is generally selected so q=q*=1. The choice of 
player 1 depends on the value of v. If 1<v<2 then there is a strategy profile of (R1,B,A}. If 
v>2 then the strategy profile chosen will be {R2, B,N}.  
It follows that this game allows for a variety of different moral stances to be taken by the 
judge in different situations. It can be seen that in a situation where morality is given low 
weight (i.e. v ≤ 1) then the judge will become commerce minded, be offered the bribe and 
accept it. If morality is given a higher weight (i.e. v>1) then the situation is not so clear. Only 
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if v>2 will the judge refuse the bribe if offered. At lower levels (1<v<2) the judge may accept 
the bribe while being commercially minded but, interestingly, the prospect that the judge may 
be morally- minded may dissuade the briber from bribing the judge at all. 
 
Conclusion 
Recently, Economics as a discipline has come under attack from various quarters. 
Some of these attacks are unjustified and come from a lack of understanding of the 
economics discipline. However, some of these attacks expose little-discussed weaknesses in 
the armoury of economic theory. One such weakness, as exposed by Michael Sandel and 
Ruth Grant, is the problem of changes in attitude or, more specifically, the corruption of 
goods. The main argument of this paper is that this problem can be tackled fairly easily as 
long as one is willing to extend one’s view of modern game theory to include the idea of 
representations. 
This change has huge advantages if it can be done successfully. First of all, it provides 
a better fit with other disciplines under the cognitive science umbrella. The use of 
representations as a modelling tool is normal usage within cognitive psychology, artificial 
intelligence and philosophy of the mind. The failure to acknowledge them within economics 
is peculiar and means that many conversations across disciplines are effectively closed off to 
economists. 
Secondly, the use of representations provides a more natural modelling technique for 
certain situations than the ones currently available. The use of Harsanyi’s type theory has had 
a profound and positive effect on economic theory, expanding the ability of economists to 
explain the economy. However, its focus on fixed types of individuals, however ingeniously 
applied, makes a very awkward fit for situations where individuals are obviously moving 
from one set of attitudes to another i.e. their types are not fixed. The method outlined here 
tries to fill in the gap in the most parsimonious way possible. Given that consistency 
conditions hold, one can model varying attitudes as a choice in representations within a game 
theoretic context. 
To a certain extent this also solves some of the problems of ad hocery that plague 
such behavioural models. While the applications outlined in the previous section do involve 
parameters to operationalise each representation, these are less arbitrary than in the Benabou 
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and Tirole model. These parameters take effect under certain conditions- when their 
representations are chosen- and their range of operation is defined by them. When they are 
triggered and in how much depth also depends on the psychological equilibrium that the 
game converges on. Also,the use of representations also allows the wide range of research in 
psychology on this topic to be exploited (Agoustinos 1995). 
Finally, the model allows a solution to the problem of the corruption of goods. Goods 
become corrupt when attitudes towards them change. In the examples put forward by Grant 
and Sandel, these usually involve situations where non-monetary transactions are converted 
into monetary transactions. In such a case the monetary reward for undertaking an action 
does not enhance the individuals’ desire to carry out that action but may undermine it. The 
desire to carry out the action, therefore, has been corrupted by the money. This change in 
desire is modelled as a change in representation resulting from a deliberate choice on the part 
of the subject on perceiving that the situation has changed. 
The model does have weaknesses and these are an obvious focus for future research. 
One obvious one is that there is no guarantee that the indicative and subjunctive utilities will 
coincide or even be monotonic with each other. This likelihood will become greater as the 
number of representations increases from the binary system investigated here. It will be 
necessary to find out how humans in practice manage to maintain consistency or, failing that, 
how they deal with the inconsistency if they do not coincide. 
The model can obviously be extended in multiple ways. One way would be to use 
evolutionary game theory to see how populations of players can converge on one 
representation or another. This would imply that all players in a game would have the 
opportunity of changing representations. The implications of this are potentially of great 
interest. One could study the spread of values, cultural mores and habits across a population 
and gain insight into many social processes.  
Another area of interest is in the thought processes involved in wishful thinking. 
There are many examples where wishful thinking seems to rule supreme in areas such as 
alternative medicine or conspiracy theories. How do populations come to converge on 
truthful representations rather than wishful scenarios? Other applications arise when 
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The following proofs require the following simple lemma: 
Lemma 1: 
If the indicative utility function U(A(x)qi/(A(x)→qi)) is equivalent to the subjunctive utility 
function then the utility of the outcome si is given by U*(qi) where U*(-) is the subjunctive 
utility function.  
Proof: 
From definition of the utility of indicative and subjunctive conditionals: 
 U(A(x)qi/(A(x)→qi))= U*(A(x)qi(A(x)→qi))  
 
Substituting the subjunctive conditional utility: 
U*(A(x)qi(A(x)→qi)) 
= U*(qiqi) by modus ponens 
=U*(qi) by tautology 
□ 
 
Proposition 1: If the subjunctive and indicative conditional utilities are equivalent then the 
utility of the outcome si which occurs after mental action Tj is played can be expressed as: 
∧ ∀ : → | → | →  
when expressed as indicative conditional utilities or: 
∧ ∗ ∀ : ∧ ∗  
when expressed as subjunctive conditional utilities. 
Proof: 
For all k:  A(x)→qk is preferentially independent of ¬ [A(x)→qk] by assumption.  
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   ¬ [A(x)→qk] is preferentially independent of A(x)→qk because ¬ [(A(x)→qk] ↔ A(x)¬qk, 
A(x) is preferentially independent of ¬ A(x), ¬qk is preferentially independent of qk hence by 
(Gorman 1968 Theorem 1)  the conjunction A(x)¬qk is preferentially independent of its 
complement. Looking at k ¬ [A(x)→qk], this is equivalent to ¬ [A(x)→q1]  ¬ [A(x)→q2] 
 ¬ [A(x)→q3] …. ¬ [A(x)→qn]. By repeated use of Gorman’s theorem, it follows that 
this is preferentially independent of its complement.  
Hence A(x)→qk is preferentially independent of ¬ [A(x)→qk] for all k and k ¬ [A(x)→qk] 
is preferentially independent of its complement. Again, using Gorman’s theorem, all subsets 
of this set of predicates are preferentially independent of their complements. This means they 
are all mutually preferentially independent of each other. 
Focus on outcome i: If A(x)qi is conditioned on A(x)→qk  for each k or k ¬ [A(x)→qk] 
then we have a utility tree structure.  This means that the conditional predicates (A(x)qi)/ 
(A(x)→qk) for each k and (A(x)qi)/ k:¬ [A(x)→qk] must be mutually preferentially 
independent of each other as well (Gorman 1968). It follows that the utilities of these 
conditional predicates are additively separable (Debreu 1960). 
Suppose that for outcomes sk with k=1….w, sk does not follow Tj , while for outcomes sk 
with k=w+1….i-1,i+1,…..,n , sk does follow Tj where n is the total number of outcomes in 
the game. 
Hence: 
∧ ∧ ∀ : → ∧ | → ⋯
∧ | → ∧ | → …
∧ | → ⋯ ∧ | →  
For k=1…w, ∧ | →  is equal to zero since it is false that A(x) holds 
because Tj cannot have been played and also si cannot have been reached. 
For k=w+1….i-1,i+1,…..,n   ∧ | →  is also equal to zero. This is because si 
does not have predicates from other outcomes influencing its utility and A(x) conditioned on 
A(x)→qk, (k≠i) is not relevant to A(x)qi. 




∧ ∀ : → ∀ : →
| → | →  
By assumption the utility of qi is solely determined by A(x)→qi. It follows that U(qi/k:¬ 
(A(x)→qk)) has a utility of zero. 
Hence: 
∧ ∀ : → | → | →  
The last two terms can be reconstituted giving equation X: 
∧ → ∧ | → …………(X) 
Looking at the first term on the RHS of equation X: 
∀ : → ⊢ ∀ : ∧  
Hence: 
∀ : → |∀ : ∧  
Assuming that all indicative conditional utilities of A(x) are equivalent to subjunctive utilities 
of A(x) then:  
|∀ : ∧ ∗ ∧ ∀ : ∧ ∗ ∀ : ∧  
Looking at the second term on the RHS of equation X, assuming subjunctive and indicative 
conditional utilities are equal and using Lemma 1: 
∧ | → ∗  
Hence: 
 




Proposition 2: Assuming mutual utility independence between the attribute vectors x and y 
and that the prospects: 
(A(x)qi  (Q(Tj,x1,y0)→qi)) with probability π;  (A(x)qi  (Q(Tj,x0,y0)→qi)) with 
probability (1-π)    and 
 (A(x)qi  (Q(Tj,x1,y1)→qi)) with probability π;  (A(x)qi  Q(Tj,x0,y1)→qi)) with 
probability (1-π) 
are indifferent for all probabilities π then the player will hold the correct representation A(x) 
and the indicative conditional utility U(A(x)qi /A(x)→qi) will be equal to the subjunctive 
utility U*(qi). 
Proof: 
If x and y are mutual utility independent of each other then (from Keeney & Raiffa): 
∗ ∧ ∧ , , →
∧ | → ∧ | →
∧ | → ∧ | →  
Where ky = U(A(x0)qi Q(Tj,x0,y1)→qi)), kx= U(A(x1)qi Q(Tj,x1,y0)→qi)) and kxy= 1-
kx-ky. 
If prospects are indifferent to each other then: 
πU*(A(x1)qi Q(Tj,x1,y0)→qi))+(1-π) U*(A(x0)qi Q(Tj,x0,y0)→qi)) 
= π U*(A(x1)qi Q(Tj,x1,y1)→qi)) + (1-π) U*(A(x0)qi Q(Tj,x0,y1)→qi)) 
Collecting terms: 
U*(A(x0)qi Q(Tj,x0,y0)→qi)) + [U*(A(x1)qi Q(Tj,x1,y0)→qi)) – U*(A(x0)qi 
Q(Tj,x0,y0)→qi))]×π = U*(A(x0) qi Q(Tj,x0,y1)→qi)) + [U*(A(x1) qi 
Q(Tj,x1,y1)→qi)) – U*(A(x0)qi Q(Tj,x0,y1)→qi))]×π 
Equating coefficients: 




U*(A(x1)qi Q(Tj,x1,y0)→qi)) – U*(A(x0)qi Q(Tj,x0,y0)→qi)) = U*(A(x1)qi 
Q(Tj,x1,y1)→qi)) – U*(A(x0)qi Q(Tj,x0,y1)→qi)) 
Normalising: 
U*(A(x0)qi Q(Tj,x0,y0)→qi)) = 0  and U*(A(x1)qi Q(Tj,x1,y1)→qi)) = 1 
Hence: 
U*(A(x0)qi Q(Tj,x0,y1)→qi)) = ky= 0   and U*(A(x1)qi Q(Tj,x1,y0)→qi)) = kx= 1 
Therefore kxy =0 
It follows that: 
U*(A(x)qi Q(Tj,x,y)→qi)) = U(A(x)qi /A(x)→qi) 
The derivation above has reduced the value of U*(A(x)qi Q(Tj,x,y)→qi)) to those parts of 
the function that are influenced by the vector x irrespective of y. Hence the only relevant 
parts of Q(Tj,x,y) are those that are influenced by x. Since there are no cross- vector complex 
predicates this reduces the relevant parts of Q(Tj,x,y) to the subset described by A(x). 
It follows that Q(Tj,x,y) = A(x). 
Hence: U*(A(x)qi  (A(x)→qi)) = U(A(x)qi /A(x)→qi) 
By lemma 1 this means that U(A(x)qi /A(x)→qi) = U*(qi) 
□ 
Proposition 3: If two representations defined by the attribute vectors x and y are mutually 
utility independent then x and y are complements if and only if  U(A(x)qi /A(x)→qi) is 
monotonically increasing with U*(A(x)qi Q(Tj,x,y)→qi)). 
Proof: 
For the sake of convenience, utilities will be abbreviated as follows: 
U*(A(x)qi Q(Tj,x,y)→qi)) = U*(x,y) 
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U(A(x)qi /A(x)→qi) = U(x) 
 U(B(y)∧qi / B(y)→qi ) = U(y) 
 
If x and y are mutually utility independent then we have equation 1: 
∗ , 	 	  
Where kx, ky >0 and all utilities are positive. 
The proof consists of two lemmas: 
Lemma A: attribute vectors x and y are complements if and only if kxy>0. 
(This is a formalisation of an informal argument by Keeney & Raiffa p. 240) 
Assume two vector examples of y, labelled ya and yb where yb≥ya (i.e. for each element ybj ≥ 
yaj but ya ≠ yb). 
By construction, the vector y is monotonic with utility so U(yb) ≥ U(ya). 
Partially differentiating holding each vector example constant: 
∗ , ∗ , ∗ ,
 
And: 
∗ , ∗ , ∗ ,
 
 
Since U(y) is independent of x: 
0 




From this follows equation 2: 
∗ , ∗ , ∗ , ∗ ,
 
Define the term in square brackets on the RHS as M: 
∗ , ∗ ,
 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) point out that if : 
∗ , ∗ ,
 
Then x and y are complements.  
By construction   is positive so the complementarity of x and y depends on the sign of M 
being negative.  Differentiating each term in M using equation 1: 
∗ ,
 
Differentiating similarly for yb and substituting into M we get: 
 
Since U(ya) – U(yb) is negative it follows that for M to be negative kxy > 0. 
Conversely, if kxy>0 then M must be negative and so it follows that the LHS of equation 2 
must be negative and so x and y are complements. 
Lemma B: 
U(x) is monotonic with U*(x,y) if and only if kxy>0. 






For U(x) to be monotonic with U*(x,y) then the RHS of equation 3 must be positive. kx is 
positive by assumption as is the utility U(y). For equation 3 to be positive it must be the case 
that kxy>0. 
Conversely, if kxy>0 then, given the positivity of kx and U(y), equation (3) must be positive as 
well and U(x) must be monotonic with U(x,y). 
 
Proof of theorem: Lemma A and Lemma B must hold at the same time when kxy>0. Hence 
the proposition follows. 
□ 
 
 
 
 
